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Abstract
A new method to derive Multivariate Quadratic equation systems
(MQ) for the input and output bit variables of a cryptographic S-box
from its algebraic expressions with the aid of the computer mathe-
matics software system SageMath is presented. We consolidate the
deficiency of previously presented MQ metrics, supposed to quantify
the resistance of S-boxes against algebraic attacks.
Key Words – Algebraic attack resistance, algebraic cryptanalysis,
Lagrange polynomial, multivariate quadratic polynomial equation sys-
tem, polynomial quotient ring, SageMath, SAT solver, S-box, Rijndael
AES.
1 Overview
We present a new automated way to produce and investigate Multivariate
Quadratic equation systems (MQ) over GF (2) for the Rijndael S-box (SRD)
and alikes. In the next we first shortly survey the principles of SRD in section
2. Recently, Jie Cui et al. [6] claimed to have presented a new and concise
approach for generating such MQ for SRD and also to have proposed a cryp-
tographically more secure S-box. In section 3 we depict the derivation of Cui
et al. In section 4 we present our automated way to produce the MQ for SRD
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aided by the computer mathematics software system SageMath [1]. As we
demonstrate later, this method can be applied for other proposed S-boxes,
alleged to be cryptographically stronger. We also generate the Gröbner bases
describing the two different S-boxes and calculate solutions of all equation
systems with the help of a SAT solver. In section 5 we investigate, critically
discuss, and dismiss equation-metrics-based criteria as inappropriate to esti-
mate the resistance against algebraic attacks (RAA) of an S-box. In sections
6 and 7 we build MQ for the S-box proposed by Jie Cui et al. [6] and show
why this is not an improvement. The complicated algebraic expression for
the S-box constructed by Cui et al. leads to a great number of equations
and independent monomials in the resulting MQ. On the basis of the RAA
formulas the new S-box should demonstrate a remarkable robustness against
algebraic attacks. But from that same S-box can be derived a much simpler
MQ leading to a polynomial system nearly as easy solvable as that of the
original SRD. This is what we do in section 7 greatly facilitated by SageMath.
Our main contribution is the demonstration of the handiness which Sage-
math offers to the researcher so that he can derive his MQ and its metrics
in a fast way and transparently verify the quality of existing formulas sup-
posed to quantify resistance of the MQ to algebraic attacks. In conclusion,
we couldn’t validate the predicted reduced hardness for a system to solve
with increasing number of equations and number of independent monomials
in the polynomial systems according to suggested RAA formulas.
2 Principle of Rijndael S-box RD
We shortly repeat its well known principles and algebraic properties [8].
Looking upon 8-bit bytes as elements in GF (28), Rijndael’s S-box is a map-
ping S : GF (28) −→ GF (28) in form of a combination of an inverse func-
tion I(x) which is a multivariate inverse modulo the irreducible polynomial
m(t) = t8 + t4 + t3 + t+1 and an affine transformation function A(x). x is a
byte variable consisting of bits xi(i = 0, . . . , 7), with x7 symbolizing the most
significant bit: x =
∑7
i=0 xit
i. The modular inverse function I(x) is defined
as:
I(x) = x254 modm(t) (1)
i.e., the modular inverse of 0 is mapped to 0. According to the AES design[9],
the affine transformation A(x) can also be described as a modular polynomial
multiplication followed by an addition (XOR) of a constant polynomial:
A(x) = a xmod(t8 + 1) + b (2)
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with a = ’1F’ and b = ’63’ . A two-digit hexadecimal number stands for a
constant byte, that is a polynomial in t, e.g, ’63’ for t6 + t5 + t + 1. The
Rijndael S-box can be written as:
SRD(x) = A ◦ I = A(I(x)) (3)
3 Rijndael S-box explored by Cui et al.
Cui et al. [6] (as Courtois and Pieprzyk [8] before them) utilize the Rijndael
S-box composition (3) to derive an MQ for it. With x the input and z
the output value, and the intermediate variable y = I(x) they note: z =
SRD(x) = A(y) = A(I(x)). Considering the inverse transformation y = I(x),
obviously xy = 1 when x not equal 0, which reads in polynomial form:(
7∑
i=0
xit
i
) 7∑
j=0
yjt
j

modm(t) = 1 (4)
The above modulo division is then analytically performed and a compar-
ison of coefficients of terms of the same order in tk, 0 ≤ k ≤ 7, leads to the
first eight multivariate quadratic equations for Rijndael S-box on the pages
2483, 2484 of the paper of Cui et al. [6] The authors give all the steps and
in-between results of the complete length of the calculation. They formulate
and evaluate two additional equations of the byte variables to define the S-
box completely. Doing so, Cui et al. replicate results already presented in
2002 by Courtois and Pieprzyk in the extended version of [8].
4 Rijndael S-box coded in Sage
SageMath or briefly Sage (System for Algebra and Geometry Experimenta-
tion) is a free open-source software system for computer mathematics.[2] It is
licensed under the Gnu General Public License. It builds on top of many ex-
isting computer mathematics open-source packages. Their combined power
is accessible through a common, Python-based language interface from the
command line or a web browser. Originally, it is designed by William Stein,
still the leader of the SageMath project, and also inventor of SageMath-
Cloud [3] for collaborative computational mathematics.
In order to work with polynomials like x =
∑7
i=0 xit
i, Sage provides mod-
ules to construct rings of multivariate polynomials. The polynomials x, y,
and z introduced in the previous section we model in Sage as follows.1 In
1The complete code presented here together with its output is accessible at SageMath-
Cloud [4].
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line 1 of listing 1 a variable for the number of bits is defined for convenience.
In line 2 a list of strings for the names of the coefficients of the three byte
polynomials is generated ([’x0’, ’x1’, .., ’z7’]).
Listing 1: Byte polynomials over a quotient ring
1 nb = 8
2 varl = [c + str(p) for c in ’xyz ’ for p in range(nb)]
3 B = BooleanPolynomialRing(names = varl)
4 B. inject_variables()
5 P.<p> = PolynomialRing(B)
6 Byte.<t> = P. quotient_ring(p^8 + p^4 + p^3 + p + 1)
7 X = B. gens ()[:nb]
8 Y = B. gens()[ nb :2* nb]
9 x = sum ([X[j]*t^j for j in range(nb )])
10 y = Byte(list(Y))
In line 3 a Boolean polynomial ring for these coefficients is constructed which
assigns GF (2) properties to them. In line 4 the coefficient names are made
available as variables. In line 5 a polynomial ring over the Boolean polynomial
ring B is constructed and from that, in line 6, the final quotient ring Byte
with modulus m(t). In lines 7 and 8, lists2 of coefficient variables of the
byte polynomials are created for convenience. With the help of these lists,
in the last two lines the polynomials are modeled in two equivalent ways, x
explicitly, and y by using the Byte constructor.
Now one can already evaluate the product xy in Sage with the commands:
E3 = x * y
eqs3 = E3.list()
In the second line we used the list() attribute to get the coefficients of
each power of t in expression E3. Due to the usage of the quotient ring, E3
is of degree 7, the length of list eqs3 (the number of coefficients) is 8. The
terms we have gotten with Sage compare with the right-hand sides (rhs) of
the system of equations with number (3) in the paper of Cui et al. [6].
Cui et al. proceeded with the generation of the next set of equations
for Rijndael’s S-box, the affine transformation. From equation (2) setting
z = A(y) it follows
y = a7(z + b)mod(t8 + 1) (5)
since a7 amod(t8 +1) = 1. Substituting (5) for y in xy we get the final form
of the first implicit eight equations representing Rijndael S-box. In Sage the
values substitution is accomplished with the help of a so called dictionary.
2To be exactly, in Python these are tuples, i.e., immutable lists.
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By using equation (5) the code in Listing 2 generates this dictionary, called
eqs4.
Listing 2: Generate a dictionary to substitute y variables
Baff.<u> = P. quotient_ring(p^8 + 1)
Z = B. gens ()[2*nb :][:nb]
z = Baff(list(Z))
a = u^4 + u^3 + u^2 + u + 1
b = u^6 + u^5 + u + 1
eqs4 = dict(zip(Y, (a^7 * (z + b)). list ()))
The first line sets up a quotient ring modulo t8+1. The next four lines define
the byte variable z and the two constant polynomials a and b in this ring
(with generator u). The rhs of equation (5) simply reads a^7 * (z + b) in
the code. The dictionary is constructed in the last line. The result is shown
in Listing 3.
Listing 3: Dictionary to substitute y variables
{y7: z6 + z4 + z1 ,
y6: z5 + z3 + z0 ,
y5: z7 + z4 + z2 ,
y4: z6 + z3 + z1 ,
y3: z5 + z2 + z0 ,
y2: z7 + z4 + z1 + 1,
y1: z6 + z3 + z0 ,
y0: z7 + z5 + z2 + 1}
The substitution of y in equation eqs3 via the dictionary succeeds with
the following:
eqs5 = [_. subs(eqs4) for _ in eqs3]
The result is again a list, the members of which give the first set of eight
multivariate quadratic equations of the S-box by setting the byte variable
product equal to 1. This list of terms eqs5 is identical to the system of
equations (5) of Cui et al. Those equations with zero constant term (7 out
of 8 above) are true with probability equal to 1. The 8th equation (the
coefficient of t0) is true only when x 6= 0, so that this equation is true with a
probability 255/256. Furthermore for ∀x 6= 0 x = x2y. Obviously this last
equation is true also when x = 0, so that one can write:
∀x ∈ GF (28)


x = yx2
x2 = y2x4
...
x128 = y128x256 = y128x
(6)
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Cui et al. take the last of the above and write two symmetrical equations
to generate an additional set of 16 equations for the Rijndael S-box. The
equations they take are: {
x128 = y128x
y128 = x128y
(7)
We develop the two last equations to get the needed additional 16 equations
for the implicated variables. We also substitute in these equations y by using
the dictionary in listing 3.
E7 = x^128 + y^128 * x
eqs7 = [_. subs(eqs4) for _ in E7. list()]
The result is a list of terms which are practically the equations (7) of Cui et
al. written in the reverse order than that of Cui’s paper. Cui et al. begin with
the expression corresponding to the highest order term of E7 while the sage
list begins with the constant term. These terms are identical with the rhs of
equations (7) in Cui et al. [6] with a couple of minimal differences which we
attribute to typographical errors in the paper of Cui et al.
Similarly, we write:
E8 = y^128 + x^128 * y
eqs8 = [_. subs(eqs4) for _ in E8. list()]
and, by setting these terms equal to 0, get the next block of eight equations
for the Rijndael S-box which are to be compared with the system (8) of
Cui et al. Here we see a couple of discrepancies which we again attribute to
typographical mistakes in the reference paper.
Using the Sage model of this S-box it is easy to count the number of
equations, the number of terms in each equation and determining the minimal
and maximal number of terms, as well as the total number of different terms,
as shown in Listing 4.
Listing 4: Survey of first S-box equation system
mq1 = eqs5 [1:] + eqs7 + eqs8
len(mq1)
lmon1 = [len(_. monomials()) for _ in mq1]
min(lmon1)
max(lmon1)
Sequence (mq1 ). nmonomials()
As mentioned above, the first equation is discarded since it is only true with
probability 255/256 (false if x = 0). This gives for the Rijndael S-box 23
equations, with between 28 and 49 monomials per equation and, in total, 81
different monomials.
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Finding the 256 solutions of this equation system representing the value
table of the byte S-box with a SAT solver in Sage is accomplished with the
following two lines of code:
Listing 5: SAT solver usage
from sage.sat. boolean_polynomials \
import solve as solve_sat
%time r = solve_sat(mq1 , n= infinity )
This takes ca. 0.6 s CPU time on a decent computer (2.8 GHz CPU, 8 GB
RAM). As a point of reference we also evaluate the Gröbner basis (GB) of
this MQ and print the number of the basis equations, as well as the maximal
degree and the number of its monomials:
Listing 6: Gröbner basis evaluation
Idl1 = B.ideal(mq1)
%time mq1gb = Idl1. groebner_basis()
print len( mq1gb)
print mq1gb. maximal_degree()
print mq1gb. nmonomials()
The evaluation of the Gröbner basis takes ca. 14 seconds, it has 8 equations
of degree 7 with 263 different monomials. The solution of the basis equations
with the SAT solver is about 4 times as fast as the solution of the MQ.
Courtois and Pieprzyk [8] state that these 23 equations are linearly inde-
pendent. Nonetheless, the last 16 equations (7) only, i.e. mq2 = eqs7 + eqs8,
are already sufficient to evaluate the Gröbner basis and to compute the S-box
value table of 256 solutions with the SAT solver which takes ca. 0.7 s CPU
time on the same computer. The 16 equations describing the Rijndael S-box
have between 28 and 49 monomials per equation and, in total, 81 different
monomials.
5 Algebraic attacks and S-box optimization
For quantifying the resistance against algebraic attacks for r equations in t
terms over GF (2n) Cui et al. [6] have used the criterion of Cheon and Lee [11]
which defines the Resistance against Algebraic Attacks (RAA) Γ as:
Γ =
(
t− r
n
)⌈(t−r)/n⌉
(8)
Courtois and Pieprzyk [8] use another criterion
ΓCP =
(
t
n
)⌈t/r⌉
(9)
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(note the brackets ⌈ ⌉ in the exponent indicating the ceiling function).3 The
value of these criteria should reflect the difficulty of solving multivariate
equations. For the Rijndael S-box we counted 23 equations and, in total,
81 different monomials. Therefore, it has Γ = (29/4)8 ≈ 222.9 and ΓCP =
(81/8)4 ≈ 213.4. The 16 equations system has Γ = (65/8)9 ≈ 227.2 and
ΓCP = (81/8)
6 ≈ 220.0. Compared with the relation of the computational
effort of the SAT solver for the MQ for 23 and 16 equations respectively, the
Γ values for the 16 equation system are exaggerated.
To generate a harder to solve equation system Cui et al. [6] have intro-
duced a more complicated Rijndael S-box structure which they name Affine-
Inverse-Affine (AIA) structure. This S-box will be explored in detail in the
next two sections.
6 MQ of the AIA structure S-box in Sage
In Cui, Huang, et al. (2011) [7], a new Rijndael S-box structure named
Affine-Inverse-Affine (AIA) is designed supposed to increase the algebraic
complexity of said S-box. Questioning this claim, we considered it worthwhile
to try and check their calculations and assertions.
A different affine transformation (2) with a = ’5B’ and b = ’5D’ is chosen.
This transformation is applied before and after the inversion step:
SAIA(x) = A ◦ I ◦ A = A(I(A(x)))
Cui et al. [6] derive a multivariate quadratic equation system of SAIA
using the coefficients of the polynomial expression of the S-box. They write
down the equation system with indices for rounds and input bytes for the
AES algorithm (but never use them). The round indices will be omitted here
as they don’t matter in what follows. As before, by x is denoted the input
byte variable of the S-box function. Intermediate variables are denoted by
y0, y1, . . . , y253 and the output variable by z. According to the polynomial
expression of the new AIA S-box, the S-box transformation can be described
by the following quadratic equations over GF(28):

x y0 = 1
ym y0 = ym+1 , for 0 ≤ m ≤ 252 and y253 = x
z = g (y0, y1, . . . , y252, x)
(10)
Cui et al. [6] define the function g by the polynomial expression of their S-
box. We calculated the coefficients for the polynomial expression of SAIA (its
3Parameter n could be interpreted as number of dependent variables, see section 6.
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Lagrange polynomial) in Sage4 and tabulate them in Listing 8. Thereby, the
function g reads
g (y0, y1, . . . , y252, x) =
’FA’ + ’12’ x + ’26’ y252 + . . . + ’E5’ y2 + ’A9’ y1 + ’A6’ y0
(11)
(The coefficients of Cui et al. [6] as listed in their Table 1 which in turn
corresponds to Table 3 in Cui, Huang, et al. [7] are wrong and don’t represent
the polynomial expression of their S-box SAIA, although, Cui, Huang, et al.
list in their preceding Table 2, correctly, the output values of SAIA.)
The equation system (10) can be modeled in Sage with the help of the
preparatory code shown in Listing 7:
Listing 7: Preparation for equation system of AIA S-box
1 nb = 8
2 ny = 253
3 varlxz = [c + str(p) for c in ’xz ’ for p in range(nb)]
4 varly = [’y’ + str(p) for p in range(nb*ny )]
5 B = BooleanPolynomialRing(names = varlxz + varly)
6 B. inject_variables()
7 P.<p> = PolynomialRing(B)
8 Byte.<t> = P. quotient_ring(p^8 + p^4 + p^3 + p + 1)
9 X = B. gens ()[:nb]
10 Z = B. gens()[ nb :][:nb]
11 YY = [B.gens ()[(2+ m)* nb :][:nb] for m in range(ny)]
12 x = Byte(list(X))
13 z = Byte(list(Z))
14 yy = [Byte( list(_Y)) for _Y in YY]
In lines 3 and 4 lists of strings for the names of coefficients for the byte
variables x, z, and y0, . . . , y252 are generated.
Then, as in Listing 1, in line 5 a Boolean polynomial ring for these co-
efficients is constructed, assigning GF (2) properties to them, in line 6 the
coefficients are made available as variables and in line 7 a polynomial ring
over the Boolean polynomial ring B is constructed and from that in line 8,
eventually, the quotient ring Byte with modulus m(t).
In lines 9 to 11 tuples of the coefficient variables of the byte polynomials
are created for convenience. For the y-variables the coefficients are grouped
byte-wise in sub-lists. In the last three lines, finally, the polynomials of
the byte variables are defined using these tuples as arguments for the Byte
constructor. For the y-variables a list of polynomials is used.
4The Sage code comprises some twenty lines and is accessible at SageMathCloud [5].
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In the next Sage code block (Listing 8), the coefficients of the polynomial
expression of SAIA are given in hexadecimal notation as a list of strings which
is transformed to a list of the constant polynomials that enter g (11):
Listing 8: Generating constant polynomials of AIA S-box
sbt = [
’FA 12 26 E7 9A C7 DB 79 56 01 D3 59 52 ED 97 C9’,
’47 46 FC 7C 5A 50 49 BF F4 F8 63 C8 82 1B EE 74’,
’3B 5D F8 02 2D 64 1A 15 BA DB 59 FE FB D6 97 FF’,
’AB 3F B4 09 32 77 AB 52 4D 96 D5 BB DE 30 DE 05’,
’62 23 7C 69 66 75 9F E9 9B 60 88 2F D1 8F 09 F4’,
’1E EF C4 48 0D A5 AE 7A 38 9B 71 F2 9F 44 B3 99’,
’20 C5 13 12 19 C2 5F 5B AD FA D5 49 7B F8 16 07’,
’B6 75 E9 B0 CA E8 83 C1 4E 75 C5 5E 91 07 86 BF’,
’6F C2 25 35 D3 7F CC 0D AC 7A C9 EC D2 3F C3 21’,
’7E A9 2A 6D A8 66 F8 7D D2 1B FE CD 58 64 25 DA’,
’AE 49 2D 4F 0C 74 F2 42 4A 87 42 9B 83 50 F1 91’,
’C1 02 4F 2A C9 19 37 59 D5 74 8D 0B 20 C5 AF 28’,
’47 FB 09 87 10 6A 3B C8 8B 08 5B 8B 13 0E 73 7E’,
’FA 45 85 18 D5 90 4E 71 E6 F2 BF EE 30 E9 99 54’,
’30 63 8F 03 92 91 0C 43 09 66 E5 76 6A 93 87 E4’,
’6C 6A 87 A1 CB 64 AA 5C FB 05 5A DE E5 A9 A6 00’]
sbt = ’ ’. join(sbt ). split ()
sbp = [Byte(ZZ(_, 16). bits()) for _ in sbt]
In the last line of this code block each two-digit hexadecimal number in
the table represented by a two character string is converted into a decimal
number by the code fragment ZZ(_, 16). Appending .bits() transforms it
into a list of 0s and 1s, a big-endian binary representation of the hexadecimal
number. Applying the Byte constructor gives the corresponding constant
polynomial.
With these preparations the equation system (10), (11) of the AIA S-box
(equation 9 in Cui et al. [6]) can be modeled in Sage as shown in Listing 9.
Listing 9: Equation system of AIA S-box in Sage
g = sbp [0] + sbp [1] * x \
+ sum(sbp [2+m] * yy[ny -1-m] for m in range(ny ))
yy. append(x)
E9 = [x * yy [0] + 1]
E9. extend(yy[m] * yy [0] + yy[m+1] for m in range(ny))
E9. append(z + g)
mq3 = flatten ([_.list() for _ in E9 ])[1:]
In the last line the first term (the t0-coefficient of xy0 +1) is discarded since
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it is only true with probability 255/256 (false if x = 0). Using this Sage
model we evaluate some metrics of this MQ as before. This gives for the
new AIA S-box 2,039 equations, with between 3 and 1,034 monomials per
equation. These equations have in total 18,232 different monomials. In order
to apply the criteria of section 5, the intermediate variables also were taken
into account by interpreting the parameter n in the definitions (8) and (9)
as the number of dependent variables. Hence, the number 8 × 254 is used
as n, and not only 8. This results in Γ = (16, 193/2, 032)8 ≈ 224.0 and
ΓCP = (18, 232/2, 032)
9 ≈ 228.5 as estimation for RAA.5
Also, the CPU time to evaluate all 256 solutions of this MQ with a SAT
solver is ca. 7 s, which is 12 (≈ 24) times as long as for the original Rijndael
S-box.
Cui et al. [6] count a totally different number of equations and terms based
on the byte variables, not on their polynomial coefficients, which contradicts
the scheme applied to the Rijndael S-box with which they compare, and
therefore, is misleading.
Further, this method used by Cui et al. [6] to derive an MQ for their AIA
S-box applies to any S-box using the coefficients of its polynomial expression.
This illustrates that the resulting numbers of equations and terms are decep-
tive as criterion for the estimation of algebraic attack resistance and inapt to
differentiate the quality of byte S-boxes. To substantiate this point, we have
derived such an MQ for the original Rijndael S-box by using its polynomial
expression in equation (10). The function g then reads
gSRD (y0, y1, . . . , y252, x) =
’63’ + ’8F’ y127 + ’B5’ y63 + ’01’ y31 + ’F4’ y15 + ’25’ y7 +
’F9’ y3 + ’09’ y1 + ’05’ y0
(12)
The same Sage code (Listings 7, 8, and 9) was used with an adapted table of
the polynomial expression coefficients in accordance with equation (12). This
MQ of the Rijndael S-box exhibits the same number of equations with the
same number of different monomials as the MQ of SAIA resulting in equally
high, misleading Γ values. Also, the SAT solver needs the same 7 s CPU
time to find the solutions of this MQ.
In contrast, we will show in the next section how to derive, aided by
computer mathematics, a much simpler MQ for the AIA S-box which shows
that its resistance against algebraic attacks according to the effort of a SAT
solver not really exceeds that of the original Rijndael S-box. But the RAA
criteria exaggerate the hardness of that simpler MQ.
5Formal application of n = 8 yields unlikely high values: Γ ≈ 222,241 and ΓCP ≈ 2
100.
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7 Concise MQ for the AIA S-box in Sage
Building on the Sage code presented so far we derive a much simpler MQ
for the AIA S-box. Its resistance against algebraic attacks according to the
RAA criterion should be greater than that of the original Rijndael S-box but
over-estimates the time it takes to solve the system with a SAT solver.
For the inversion step we now use, temporarily, two intermediate byte
variables y0 and y1, named yy[0] and yy[1] in the Sage code. Their coeffi-
cients shall be y0, . . . , y7 and y8, . . . , y15, respectively. The three steps of the
AIA S-box are
z = A(y1) , y1 = I(y0) , y0 = A(x)
Beginning with the inversion step we first model


y1280 = y
128
1 y0
y1281 = y
128
0 y1
y30 = y
4
0y1
y31 = y
4
1y0
(13)
The last two equations in (13) are the only other additional (fully quadratic)
MQ (besides y0y1 = 1) for the inversion as stated already by Courtois and
Pieprzyk in the extended version of [8] (compare also Cheon and Lee [11]).
These additional equations are necessary to completely define the S-box SAIA.
Without them the system is under-defined, as, for example, the solution with
a SAT solver shows. In Sage the equations (13) read
E10 = yy [0]^128 + yy [1]^128 * yy [0]
E11 = yy [1]^128 + yy [0]^128 * yy [1]
E12 = yy [0]^3 + yy [0]^4 * yy [1]
E13 = yy [1]^3 + yy [1]^4 * yy [0]
The linear transformations according to equation (2) are
y0 = a xmod(t
8 + 1) + b (14)
y1 = a
7(z + b)mod(t8 + 1) (15)
with a = ’5B’ (hence a8 mod(t8+1) = 1) and b = ’5D’ . In Sage we formulate
Listing 10: Generate dictionary to substitute y variables
1 Baff.<u> = P. quotient_ring(p^8 + 1)
2 a = Baff(ZZ(’0x5B ’). bits())
3 b = Baff(ZZ(’0x5D ’). bits())
4 eqs14 = dict(zip(YY[0] , a * Baff(x) + b))
5 eqs14. update(zip(YY[1] , a^7 * (Baff(z) + b)))
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The right hand sides of equations (14) and (15) enter Listing 10 in the two
last lines. Both their coefficients are inserted into the same dictionary eqs14.
Applying this substitutions in Sage to get rid of the intermediate byte vari-
ables is straight forward
eqs10 = [_. subs(eqs14) for _ in E10.list ()]
eqs11 = [_. subs(eqs14) for _ in E11.list ()]
eqs12 = [_. subs(eqs14) for _ in E12.list ()]
eqs13 = [_. subs(eqs14) for _ in E13.list ()]
and gives already the final, concise MQ for the S-box SAIA:
mq5 = eqs10 + eqs11 + eqs12 + eqs13
For this MQ counting the numbers of equations and monomials in Sage is
done as before. It has 32 equations, with between 33 and 60 monomials
per equation and 137 different monomials in total. This makes according to
definitions (8) and (9) Γ = (105/8)14 ≈ 252 and ΓCP = (137/8)
5 ≈ 220.5.
Nonetheless, the SAT solver takes ca. 0.8 s CPU time on the same com-
puter (2.8 GHz CPU, 8 GB RAM) to find all and only 256 solutions for this
MQ. The evaluation of its Gröbner basis takes ca. 16 s. The GB has 8 equa-
tions of degree 7 with 263 different monomials and its solution with a SAT
solver is obtained as fast as that of the GB of the Rijndael S-box. Clearly,
the values of the hardness criteria do not correlate with the effort of the SAT
solver for this MQ.
For comparison and as an additional reference value for the RAA estima-
tion, we have derived such an MQ with 32 equations for the original Rijndael
S-box using the four equations (13) (replacing y0 by x and y1 by y) and its
affine transformation (5) (with a = ’1F’ , b = ’63’ ). This MQ has the same
number of equations and the same number of different monomials, thus, the
same values for the hardness criteria as that of SAIA. The solution with the
SAT solver of this MQ for the original Rijndael S-box takes the same CPU
time as the solution of the 32 equation MQ of SAIA, namely, ca. 0.8 s. This
shows how Sage can easily be used to disprove the practicality of the hardness
criteria.
8 Conclusion
SageMath is a very appropriate, powerful computer mathematics tool to an-
alyze cryptographic problems formulated with byte variables as polynomials
in a quotient ring. Sage draws its strength in this area mainly from the
integration of the BRiAl, former PolyBoRi, library [1, 12].
We have used Sage to demonstrate how to produce various polynomial
13
Multivariate Quadratic equation systems (MQ) as well as their Gröbner basis
for the Rijndael S-box SRD and similar S-boxes in a simple and straightfor-
ward manner. Using the flexible structures and interface of Sage one can
easily evaluate metrics of the resulting polynomial systems, like the number
of different monomials in the system, the length of the equations, the fre-
quency of the appearance of certain terms or variables in equations etc. With
this facility we generated the necessary inputs for the application of estima-
tions of the Resistance against Algebraic Attacks (RAA) proposed by Cui et
al. [6] or by Courtois and Pieprzyk [8]. Parallelly, we performed numerical
experiments by solving the corresponding MQ with a SAT solver using the
required computing time as a measure for the RAA.
Our results in this respect are revealing. We couldn’t validate the pre-
dicted reduced hardness for a system to solve with increasing number of
equations and number of independent monomials in the polynomial systems
which both the formulas forecast. There is in fact a slight increased solver
effort when one reduces from the 23 Rijndael S-box equations to the 16 but
quantitatively this is badly represented in both formulas.
Cui et al. constructed a complicated algebraic expression for a new Rijn-
dael S-box SAIA (starting from its Lagrange polynomial expression with 255
coefficients) which necessarily leads to a great number of equations and in-
dependent monomials in the resulting MQ. On this basis they thought they
have demonstrated a remarkable new S-box practically not possible to solve
according to the here discussed and by us dismissed RAA formulas. However
there are gaps in their concept arising from inconsistency in their comparison
principle as well as the lack of thoroughness in the investigation of the prop-
erties of the new algebraic expression which we showed can be equivalently
written in a much simpler form leading to a polynomial system nearly as
easy solved as that of the original Rijndael S-box.
We also mapped the original Rijndael S-box with its 9 Lagrange coeffi-
cients on the AIA form of Cui et al. which gave us as result the same huge
number of variables and multitude of polynomials which should manifest that
this is no way to create especially hard cryptographic S-boxes.
We presented how to show with SageMath that the, by Cui et al. so called,
improved S-box SAIA is in fact not even marginally an improvement.
Table 1 gives a survey of the MQ and the results of the algebraic attack
resistance estimations scrutinized in this work.
We conclude, that in order to assess the resistance of an S-box against
algebraic attacks it is not sufficient to derive some multivariate quadratic
equation system and analyze it. Instead one would have to show that the
derived MQ is optimal and superior to its Gröbner basis for solving and,
thus, attacking it or the cipher it is used in.
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S-box
MQ Gröbner
RD RD AIA/RD AIA/RD AIA/RD
maximal degree 2 2 2 2 7
# equations 23 16 2,039 32 8
# monomials 81 81 18,232 137 263
# dependent variables 8 8 2,032 8 8
log2(Γ) 22.9 27.2 24.0 52.0 –
log2(ΓCP) 13.4 20.0 28.5 20.5 –
SAT solver CPU time 0.6 s 0.7 s 7 s 0.8 s 0.15 s
Table 1: Survey of S-box MQ and estimations of their RAA.
References
[1] William A. Stein et al., Sage Mathematics Software (Version 7.4). The
Sage Development Team, 2016, http://sagemath.org.
[2] Wikipedia: SageMath, Sage (mathematics software),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SageMath.
[3] SageMathCloud, collaborative computational mathematics and
course management; founder and main architect is William Stein,
https://cloud.sagemath.com/.
[4] The Sage code and its output for generating S-box multivari-
ate quadratic polynomial equation systems at SageMathCloud:
https://cloud.sagemath.com/projects/f5a9e4b0-3adb-4152-a9ea-e3ecfbcaedcd/files/
[5] The Sage code and its output for calculating
an S-box Lagrange Polynomial at SageMathCloud:
https://cloud.sagemath.com/projects/f5a9e4b0-3adb-4152-a9ea-e3ecfbcaedcd/files/
[6] Jie Cui, Hong Zhong, Jiankai Wang and Runhua Shi, Generation and
Optimization of Rijndael S-box Equation System, Information Technology
Journal, 13: 2482–2488, 2014.
[7] Jie Cui, Liusheng Huang, Hong Zhong, Chinchen Chang and Wei Yang,
An improved AES S-Box and its performance analysis, Int. J. Innovative
Comput. Inform. Control, 7: 2291–2302, 2011.
[8] Nicolas T. Courtois and Josef Pieprzyk, Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
with Overdefined Systems of Equations, Proc. of Asiacrypt 2002, LNCS
15
2501, Springer-Verlag, 267–287, 2002.
An extended version of this paper is available on eprint.iacr.org
http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/044.
[9] Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, The design of Rijndael:
AES – the Advanced Encryption Standard, Springer-Verlag, 2002,
http://jda.noekeon.org/.
[10] Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Fed-
eral Information Processing Standards Publication 197, 2001,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf.
[11] Jung Hee Cheon and Dong Hoon Lee, Resistance of S-Boxes against
Algebraic Attacks, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3017, 83–93, 2004.
[12] Michael Brickenstein and Alexander Dreyer, PolyBoRi: A
framework for Gröbner-basis computations with Boolean polyno-
mials, Journal of Symbolic Computation 44, 1326–1345, 2009,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jsc.2008.02.017.
16
